INTRODUCTION
New technologies provide new opportunities and new potentials. Technological developments, however, do not determine human fates; rather, they change the constraints within which people act. [FN 1] The global reach of the Internet, the low marginal cost of online activity, and the relative anonymity of users have changed the balance of forces that have previously served to keep in check certain undesirable behaviors in the physical world.
These characteristics of "cyberspace" [FN 2 ] have lowered the cost of perpetrating undesirable behavior by eliminating certain barriers to entry, lowering transaction costs and reducing the probability of getting caught. [FN 3] In addition, these characteristics make traditional enforcement strategies, particularly identifying and apprehending perpetrators after they commit online crime, both less effective and more expensive. [FN 4] At the same time, however, other characteristics of cyberspace provide new opportunities to control illegal acts. Unlike in the physical world, in cyberspace certain readily identifiable third parties -Internet service providers ("ISPs") [FN 5 ] -have exclusive technical control over the infrastructure through which most illegal online behavior is carried out.
Thus, one strategy for controlling online behavior is to impose some responsibility on such third parties in order to control user misconduct before illegal acts are committed or to help identify and apprehend criminals after the fact. In other cases, the same logic can be applied to second parties -that is, victims of online crime who control the systems on which crime is committedand legal responsibility to encourage optimal victim behavior can also be employed.
The purpose of this paper is to briefly examine the rationale and opportunity for online crime control through system architecture by imposing certain technical responsibilities on victims and implicated third parties.
In particular, we examine affirmative obligations for ISPs to report criminal activity and retain data, and for victims to employ some minimal level of technical protective measures. In addition, we briefly discuss tort-based mechanisms to encourage both victims and third parties to adopt reasonable technical measures to prevent illegal behavior.
OVERVIEW
Although the Internet has been with us for more than two decades now [FN 6 ], the threshold question still seems to be [FN 7] whether cyberspace is a "unique and wholly new" thing [FN 8 ] -so different as to require new laws or doctrine, maybe even its own transnational jurisprudence [FN 9 ] -or that, although the technology is new, the legal problems are familiar and existing legal doctrine and analysis can easily accommodate the new developments. [FN 10] As with all such questions, neither answer is entirely correct.
Determining where old doctrines can be extended to new circumstance or where new doctrines are required to fill interstitial gaps in old theory requires understanding how, and to what extent, v. RemarQ Communities, 239 F.3 rd 619, 623 (4 th Cir. 2001) (the DMCA "defines service provider broadly").
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Although ARPANET, the predecessor to what we now know as the "Internet" can trace its origins to the 1960s, it was January 1, 1983 when the TCP/IP protocol was adopted as the host protocol for ARPANET. See generally, Internet Society, "All About the Internet: Internet Histories," at http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/. 
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See "Chapter Six: Of the Proportion between Crimes and Punishments," in Beccaria, supra footnote 16. And, see Catherine T. Clarke, supra footnote 18 (critiquing current law enforcement approaches to cybercrime along these lines) and O'Neill, supra footnote 3, at 274 ("Significant constraints may affect penalty levels, however. We are unlikely to threaten teenaged hackers with lengthy prison terms for a variety of constitutional, humanitarian, and other political concerns."). Obviously, prosecutorial discretion has significant impact here as well. illegal activity. So too, decisions whether and how to use encryption, authentication, access control and logging have significant impact on the cost of perpetration, the difficulty of detection and the ease of escape.
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The fact that any particular hacker could or could not overcome any technical means to control specific behaviors is not relevant to the general notion of using system architecture to control behavior any more than the observation that "a locksmith can pick any lock" is to the relevance of locks in crime prevention. See Lawrence Lessig, "Constitution in Cyberspace," 45 Emory L. J. 869, 896 n. 80 (1996), cited in Lee, supra footnote 25, at 843 n. 17. Summarizing Austin's work here is beyond the scope of this paper, however, for our purposes, the salient points about performative speech-acts are that they are contextual. That is, their ability to perform ("do things") is dependent on the context in which they occur (for example, shouting "fire" in the woods versus shouting it in a crowded theatre is fundamentally different, and is treated differently as a matter of law, because of the performative effect from context).
So, in cyberspace, many illegal behaviors could not occur "but for" the provision of services or infrastructure by third parties (or could be easily detected or traced "but for" certain technical decisions by providers). Thus, society may require some minimal level of responsibility to control illegal acts enabled through the provision of services on the part of the providers of such service.
This is no different than in realspace where we impose certain technical or standards requirements on manufacturers before allowing their products into the stream of commerce or where we put certain duties on third party service providers, for example, certain minimum care standards for professionals. Even in the context of the First Amendment we burden protected speakers, for example, holding newspapers liable for "reckless disregard" of truth in defamation cases involving public figures.
In cyberspace, where almost every business or technical decision defines system architecture (see footnote 31 supra) and thus has significant impact on both what behaviors are enabled and the mechanisms of "surveillance and discipline" available (see text accompanying footnotes 26-28 supra), imposing a concomitant responsibility to include legitimate law enforcement requirements in such decision making seems appropriate. This is particularly so where, as with victims and ISPs in the context of cybercrime, private action can accomplish control at significantly lower overall costs.
(But see the text accompanying footnote 43 infra discussing problems of over-deterrence and accountability.).
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Meir Dan-Cohen, "Harmful Thoughts: Essays on Law, Self and Morality," Princeton: Princeton University Press (2002) at 199-241. It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully summarize DanCohen's work, however, constitutive responsibility for our purposes here can be analogized to the third party responsibility that inures to a tavern owner or bartender for the subsequent actions of a drunk driver. See ibid. at 221-224.
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Others, of course, would argue the contrapose -that merely supplying the infrastructure in which criminal behavior can occur should not be subject to liability or incur any duty of care. This is the "guns don't kill, people do" argument. However much this argument appeals to the libertarians, whether in realspace or cyberspace, it is not reflective of the reality of legal responsibility.
Constitutive responsibility is ascribed throughout the legal system, for example, through the doctrines of vicarious, contributory and negligent liability regimes in tort, and in criminal law through use of the "reckless" standard for certain contributory acts. 
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It is not our contention, however, that such activities are necessarily unconstitutional. Quite the contrary, we believe that narrowly circumscribed monitoring strategies, particularly traffic analysis, are not only constitutionally permissible, but also socially desirable and will be increasingly employed as the network is further developed. We leave discussion of these issues to a future paper in which we may discuss in greater detail how these strategies could be employed. However, in addition to the constitutional questions raised above, any such monitoring-regulation regime is likely to suffer from (i) inflexibility in that such a regime imposes a uniform standard on performance regardless of particular conditions, costs or relative benefits in a particular situation (or for a specific service), (ii) a tendency to establish a floor (or ceiling) for performance and "lock in" a set level of performance, and (iii) discouragement of technical innovation (no incentive to innovate beyond existing standards 48 Not only will new innovation outpace legislative standard setting, but technological innovation will be directed specifically at circumventing such standards much like the development of second generation peer-to-peer networks such as Morpheus and Kazaa were developed to circumvent the "standards" for liability set forth in Napster. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss tort-based regimes in detail [FN 64] , however, the following aspect of tort schemes is worth comment. One way that tort liability could potentially bring preventative precautions to cyberspace concerns insurance companies.
Insurance companies profit by exploiting the downward cost curve. They insure against a condition that has some likelihood of occurring and calculate the premium on that basis. They then educate the customer about ways to reduce the likelihood of the insured event occurring, which benefits the potential victim by providing information to avoid loss and benefits the insurer but reducing payouts. [FN 65] A good example of this result is fire prevention. Fire prevention has largely succeeded because insurance companies stepped in to become fire-prevention educators for building owners, architects and designers. In addition they developed and then lobbied for adoption of fire safety codes and other fire prevention regulation. A similar result might be induced by applying tort liability to cybercrime victims and third party ISPs. [FN 66] CONCLUSION This paper has briefly examined the rationale and opportunity for using certain aspects of systems architecture to help control cybercrime. In particular, we have examined several victim and third party strategies for situations in which the potential victim and implicated third parties control the underlying infrastructure through which the crime is enabled. Although the opportunity exists to enlist much more aggressive third party and victim participation, this paper only suggests adoption of incremental expansion of existing approaches to require third parties to report crime and improve data retention, and for victims to adopt minimal protective measures.
[ FN 67] This paper should be considered a preliminary research agenda rather than as a definitive statement on these issues.
